Chinese company shareholders revolt against Communist control by Singapore Management University
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Perspectives@SMU Centre for Management Practice
4-2017
Chinese company shareholders revolt against
Communist control
Singapore Management University
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/pers
Part of the Asian Studies Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons,
and the International Business Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Centre for Management Practice at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Perspectives@SMU by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at
Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
Singapore Management University. Chinese company shareholders revolt against Communist control. (2017). Perspectives@SMU.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/pers/333
CHINESE COMPANY 
SHAREHOLDERS REVOLT 
AGAINST COMMUNIST CONTROL 
Published:  
28 Apr 2017 
 
 
This article is republished with permission by China Business Knowledge at Chinese University 
of Hong Kong Business School.  
By Prof. Zhang Tianyu, School of Accountancy and Director of the Center for Institutions and 
Governance, CUHK Business School 
  
Shareholders of low-profile Chinese property developer Tianjin Realty Development recently 
made news by voting to keep party politics out of the Shanghai-listed company's organisational 
structure. Such action has never been heard of before at any State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) in 
the history of China's economic modernisation. 
  
What actually happened was that shareholders holding more than 36% of the company’s stock 
rejected a motion to establish a Chinese Communist Party committee within the company. For 
the motion to pass, it needed two-thirds support, so the proposal failed by only a few percentage 
points. 
  
The motion was proposed based on guidance from the party and the agency that supervises 
state assets. While party committees have existed within SOEs since they came into being, the 
fervor to include them in corporate governance structures was renewed in 2015 based on 
President Xi Jinping's wish to tighten supervision over state-owned companies, improve their 
efficiency and reduce corrupt practices within them. 
  
What happened at Tianjin Realty appears to amount to a "rebellion" against this mandate to 
strengthen the party’s grip on state-owned groups. For those of us used to Western-style 
corporate governance, well-established company law and self-regulated markets, the mere 
presence of a political entity within a company may sound threatening or even terrifying. But in 
China, as well as in other one-party states, it is commonplace. 
  
What we see in Tianjin Realty's case is the rise of an alternative voice that does not toe the party 
line. This is perceived as a bold move because going against the grain in China's political 
environment is inherently risky. In fact, no one knows how this unprecedented move will cost the 
company going forward. 
SHAREHOLDER CONFIDENCE 
  
Why was there a shift in the typical lopsided, sure-fire, pro-government voting pattern all of a 
sudden? It is unknown who voted for and against the motion. But looking at shareholders with 
equity stakes of less than 5 percent, a whopping 90 percent voted against the proposal. 
  
These minority shareholders include professional money managers: UBS, the company’s 
second-biggest shareholder, has a 4.03 percent stake; a mainland private property developer 
has 2.81 percent; and a private individual owns 2.32 percent. 
  
Professional investors tend to believe that they can efficiently monitor company performance and 
management activities without the interference of party committees. To them, the presence of a 
political body may post a threat to their autonomy in guiding the enterprise the way they want to, 
possibly in ways the Communist Party may not approve of. 
  
On the other hand, the Chinese government's quest to tighten control over SOEs is a result of 
rampant corruption in these companies. It is no secret that many SOE managers and chairmen 
have been involved in squeezing resources from state assets, so political interference is the 
government's way of righting wrongs. 
  
It is easy to fall under the assumption that this kind of conflict between market forces and political 
control is unique to China. But even in a free-market economy like the U.S., such conflicts have 
always existed. Rather than party control, political interference comes in the form of legal 
regulations on private business activities. The question is how to reduce conflict and make both 
sides happy. 
  
The Chinese authorities could employ experts who are knowledgeable in modern economics to 
monitor SOE activities. The government should understand that modern companies are 
increasingly sensitive to political intervention as they become more exposed to Western-style 
corporate governance, especially those who have professional investors among their 
shareholders. 
  
The best way to mitigate conflict and strengthen trust would be to hire professional bodies to 
represent the state, such as a high-quality auditor to look after the accounting numbers, and put 
professionals on the board of directors to monitor executives on behalf of Beijing. This would not 
only increase the state's credibility in its monitoring work, but also improve lines of 
communication between the state and SOEs. 
  
Having said that, it is hard to see what happened at Tianjin Realty becoming a trend. However, it 
is helpful to ponder how the relationship between the Communist Party and modern enterprises 
can develop in a constructive way rather than escalate into deeper conflicts. 
 
